Can Iran's Bomb Be Stopped? - Kayhan Barzegar

Iran's Foreign Policy Strategy after Saddam

Kayhan Barzegar is an assistant professor of international relations at Science and Research Campus, Islamic Azad University, a senior research fellow at the Center for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, and a research fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. He can be reached at kayhan_barzegar @hks.harvard.edu.


The prevailing view in the United States is that Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy and Iran’s increasing presence in the region has been offensive, expansionist, opportunistic, and often ideological. Though Iran has occasionally taken advantage of new opportunities, these characterizations have been exaggerated in the United States. Instead, Iran’s action should be perceived in a more pragmatic light. Though Ahmadinejad may himself be an ideological and divisive figure, Iran’s foreign policy strategy predates him and ought to be viewed as a wider Iranian effort to secure its geostrategic interests and national security concerns. Despite Ahmadinejad’s tendencies to indulge his eccentricities, the logic of Iran’s foreign policy decisionmaking process always ensures this return to pragmatism.

If the Iranian leadership’s actions are perceived as offensive and expansionist, then the rational choice for the United States is to maintain robust deterrence. In contrast, if Iran’s policies are defensive, then the rational choice for the United States is to seek cooperation with Iran and eventually to help integrate Iran into the regional political-security architecture. Such integration is certainly inseparable from settling the ongoing nuclear dispute and reaching a broader and much anticipated détente with the United States. It is essential that Washington not misinterpret Iran’s actions. Misreading Iran prevented the Bush administration from pursuing engagement and cooperation. President Barack Obama must not make the same mistake. He should reexamine the current perception of Iran’s regional aims and redefine Iran’s place in U.S. Middle East policy.

After Iran’s June 2009 presidential election, Western commentators and policymakers have speculated about divisions among the Iranian political elite, and how to exploit them to gain leverage on Iran’s nuclear program and various outstanding regional disputes. Such a policy, however, will bear little fruit. Though there are of course differences of style and approach among the elite, it is clear that Iran’s nuclear program has the capability to unite them, especially in the face of foreign threats of increased sanctions and military attack. What, therefore, should be the Obama administration’s stance toward Ahmadinejad’s second term in office?

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