

Can Sanctions Stop Proliferation?

In contemporary international relations, sanctions are a means of settling disputes and attaining specific policy objectives,¹ often employed to reflect the dissatisfaction of certain members of the international community over another member's domestic or international behavior. Some argue that sanctions never work, whereas others think that they serve to moderate undesirable behavior, although often not entirely effectively.² In recent years, sanctions have been imposed against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Iran to compel these regimes to give up their nuclear weapons or suspected nuclear programs. How effective have these sanctions been, and what do these cases say about China's evolving attitudes toward sanctions as a nonproliferation tool?

Conditions of Effective Sanctions

Sanctions have historically been imposed when a state has domestically or internationally violated a code of conduct, for instance, regarding the protection of human rights or other generally accepted moral standards. The UN Charter allows for such action should massive abuses of human rights occur, even though the chief mission of the United Nations is to protect state sovereignty.³ During the Cold War, for example, the apartheid system in South Africa was strongly and persistently condemned worldwide. Beginning in 1974, the UN excluded South Africa from participating in all international organizations and conferences under UN auspices.⁴ Many countries participated in the sanctions regime against Pretoria as well.

Dingli Shen is a professor and executive dean of the Institute of International Studies and director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai. He may be reached at dlshen@fudan.ac.cn.

© 2008 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
The Washington Quarterly • 31:3 pp. 89–100.

Sanctions are also imposed after a state commits an act that violates established international law or is viewed as destabilizing regional order or global security. Theoretically, every country has sovereignty in deciding its own foreign and defense policy, and there is no requirement to mandate that certain or all countries participate in any particular international regimes, such as those related to nuclear nonproliferation. Nevertheless, under certain circumstances, the UN may decide that some countries may not be entitled to absolute sovereignty.⁵ For example, UN Security Council Resolution 687 stripped Iraq of its right to possess certain categories of unconventional weapons after its disastrous 1991 invasion of Kuwait.⁶

Sanctions have not been sufficient to accomplish nonproliferation ends in Iran.

In these cases, economic and political sanctions are designed to deliver enough harm or at least threat, short of warfare, to compel a state to refrain from undesirable behavior or actions.⁷ Analyzing past and current sanctions cases suggests that the effectiveness of international sanctions is contingent on four factors: the legitimacy of sanctions through international law or moral standards, the impacts of the sanctions on sanction-imposing states, the degree of

international participation, and the sanctions' strength as a deterrent.

The sanctions against apartheid in South Africa met all four criteria. Apartheid is generally considered to be a violation of human dignity and equality. The Universal Declaration on Human Rights provides a legal and moral basis for sanctions against such acts. A majority of world states boycotted Pretoria collectively, cutting off its economic lifeline. The political and economic pressures exerted by the sanctions, coupled with long-term, widespread domestic resistance, forced the white regime to end its reign in the early 1990s.

Sanctions are less successful when one or several of these components are absent. The boycott of the 1980 Moscow Olympics, although well conceived, did not achieve its purpose. The boycott demonstrated the displeasure of some members of the international community, including the United States and China, toward the military action of the Soviet armed forces in Afghanistan at that time, but it hardly affected the Soviet invasion. Rather, the sanctions sacrificed the rights of those nations' athletes to compete in the games and invited the Soviet bloc to retaliate by boycotting the 1984 Summer Olympics in Los Angeles. The sources of the 1980 failure were multitude: Its legitimacy was compromised by suspicions of simple Cold War competition; linking sports to politics is neither conducive nor effective; the cost of sanctions on those who boycotted was rather high, as athletes of the boycotting countries had trained intensely for the Games; only one-fifth of the world's states

participated; and the Soviet Union tolerated the costs of the sanctions, which did not affect its core interests.

Iran's Intransigence

In 2002 the world learned of the existence of two nuclear facilities in Iran. Although its nuclear capabilities were not fully developed and Iran, like any other country, is entitled to undertake a full range of fuel cycle development, including uranium enrichment to fuel nuclear power reactors for civilian uses, it carried out this program without reporting it to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iran's failures to honor its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) have been many. Despite Tehran gradually revealing some details of its nuclear program, the IAEA has identified additional undeclared matters and has encountered difficulty in securing Iran's cooperation in resolving a number of issues. For example, Tehran did not report importing centrifuges from Pakistan. When this fact was exposed, it initially made no effort to explain the sources of those centrifuges, the history of their use, and most importantly, why Tehran failed to report them and even tried to conceal certain facts.

The White House and U.S. intelligence community have long suspected that Iran's nuclear intentions are not innocent.⁸ Despite subsequent IAEA inspections and U.S. intelligence efforts, however, Washington cannot conclude that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. To the contrary, the National Intelligence Council concluded with high confidence in November 2007 that Iran terminated its nuclear weapons program in the fall of 2003.⁹ This latest judgment coincides with the latest resolution by the IAEA Board of Governors.¹⁰

Although the IAEA has asserted that Iran is not developing nuclear weapons now,¹¹ it still demands that Iran be more cooperative in clarifying the nature of parts of its past nuclear program. Given the murkiness of Iran's past historical development, two possible scenarios may explain Iran's nuclear past. Iran may be innocent but careless, developing civilian nuclear power but failing to report its activities, or alternatively, Iran has sought nuclear technology to have an immediate weapons capability or to possess the technical preparedness to create one later.

Iran has nevertheless violated its NPT commitment, even if it never had a weapons program. The international community has been disappointed by the fact that Tehran has not reported its nuclear program, later claimed as exclusively civilian, to the IAEA and has been frustrated by Iran's long-standing unwillingness or inability to clarify its past nuclear activities to the world's satisfaction. Various IAEA resolutions were passed to urge Iran to be cooperative. Because those failed to compel cooperation, on February 4,

2006, the IAEA brought Iran's nuclear issue to the UN Security Council, which passed three sanctions resolutions—Resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006; Resolution 1747 on March 24, 2007; and Resolution 1803 on March 3, 2008—to coerce Iran to immediately suspend or stop its ongoing uranium-enrichment programs until its past nuclear history is cleared.

Resolution 1737 demands that Iran “shall without further delay suspend proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities.”¹² Until it complies, Resolution 1737

Without sanctions, it is unlikely the DPRK would have disabled its nuclear weapons capacity.

bans the supply of nuclear-related technology and materials, freezes the assets of key individuals and companies related to the enrichment program, and calls on countries to report travel into their territory by Iranian officials involved in that program. Resolution 1747 incrementally tightens these sanctions and imposes a ban on arms sales. Finally, Resolution 1803 extends financial sanctions to additional entities and travel bans to additional persons, calls on member states to inspect cargo bound to or from

Iran, and urges countries to be cautious in providing trade incentives and guarantees to Iran.

In addition to the UN Security Council sanctions, the United States has imposed various sanctions on Iran. In October 2007, it enacted its harshest sanctions against Iran since the seizure of the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979. Washington launched financial sanctions against banking institutions and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its associated companies, the first instance of sanctions against foreign armed forces.

The escalation of the UN and U.S. sanctions demonstrates that the sanctions imposed thus far have not met expectations.¹³ Tehran has apparently not taken the Security Council's demands and the U.S. financial sanctions into serious consideration. It is pushing its uranium-enrichment program forward, and some of its cooperation with the IAEA under the terms of the Additional Protocol is still suspended. Iran has openly challenged the legality of the sanctions resolutions and has threatened to sue the Western countries imposing sanctions.

Why has this been the case? First, Iran has indeed violated international law for failing to meet its reporting obligations, but no solid evidence establishes yet that Iran was developing nuclear weapons in the past or at present, undermining the sanctions' perceived legitimacy. Both the IAEA and U.S. government have publicly ruled out the likelihood that Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons. Even though the U.S. National Intelligence Council concluded that Iran worked on nuclear weapons programs prior to

late 2003, most countries will only take published U.S. intelligence estimates as a reference but depend more heavily on IAEA data for decisionmaking.

Such sanctions are thus legally controversial. As long as Iran is found not to have developed weapons now, it has full rights to carry out an independent civilian nuclear energy program with its own nuclear fuel cycle. The world community can be wary of the true nature of Iran's "civilian" program, but that concern should not deprive Tehran of its legitimate rights to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The most balanced approach to addressing this question seems to be to allow Iran's enrichment program while closely monitoring its operation.

Also, some question the second criterion for the effectiveness of sanctions: the stakes for countries involved. How seriously would Iran's nuclear development hurt others if it went unsanctioned? Peaceful enrichment will certainly harm no one, assuming Iran does not develop weapons capabilities later on. If Iran is building a weapons program, however, some states could be affected, and some regional players and Muslim constituencies might be inspired to strike a balance of power in the Middle East by developing their own deterrent. This may ironically be a benefit for other regional states, providing the justification for those states that wish to pursue their own nuclear weapons to go ahead.

Third, the criterion of sanctions' strength has not been met. The sanctions so far have been weak, with the "tailored" sanctions targeting only Tehran's nuclear and missile programs. They are limited and focused in order to prevent Iran from quickly weaponizing its nuclear capabilities. Yet, given Iran's energy resources, the international community has been unwilling to impose any sanctions on Iran that would hurt energy trade between Tehran and many other capitals. Many countries will not embrace a comprehensive punitive package that undermines their overall economic partnership with Iran. The sanctions thus far do not threaten Iran's core interests and its most crucial and vulnerable sector: the export of petroleum and gas.

Punishing Iran has therefore been a self-contradictory mission, with some members of the international community declaring paramount nonproliferation concerns, whereas others sympathize with Tehran or need access to Iran's energy resources. Attempting to bypass those unwilling states would violate the third criterion: international participation. The means have not been sufficient to accomplish nonproliferation ends in Iran.

The Empirical Record in North Korea

The North Korean sanctions case also involves a nuclear program long suspected of having a military dimension. Yet, the DPRK nuclear nightmare

has already come true with Pyongyang conducting a nuclear test, exposing sanctions as insufficient.

Some would argue that the DPRK might have violated the NPT before it quit the treaty in 2003. That possibility aside, however, once it walked away from the NPT, the DPRK was no longer bound by it. In this sense, Pyongyang is free to choose its nuclear path.¹⁴ Yet, North Korea cannot be completely free as it is still bound by a 1992 bilateral commitment with South Korea.¹⁵ Under the Joint Declaration, North and South Korea agree not to test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy, or use nuclear weapons; to use nuclear energy solely

for peaceful purposes; and not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment. In this context, Pyongyang's subsequent processing of plutonium and nuclear testing have violated that Korean peninsula bilateral commitment.

In September 2006, the Department of the Treasury imposed financial sanctions on Macau-based Banco Delta Asia, which was believed to have assisted North Korea's financial

transactions. The U.S. action certainly undercut Pyongyang's international financial capability, as it forced various countries and financial agencies to distance themselves from Banco Delta Asia to avoid collateral damage. When the United States lifted the sanctions two years later, Chinese banks were reluctant to serve as conduits for bringing the frozen assets back to the DPRK for fear of damaging their reputation. The sanctions impacted North Korea financially. Nevertheless, Pyongyang responded with a nuclear test in October 2006 to demonstrate that the U.S. sanctions were not effective.

The DPRK's nuclear weapons and missile development is unwelcome at the least and possibly destabilizing. All of its neighbors are NPT members, with non-nuclear-weapon member states committing not to acquire nuclear weapons and China, its main nuclear neighbor, committing not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon states. North Korean nuclear weapons development upsets regional stability in Northeast Asia and could eventually harm Pyongyang's own peripheral security environment. Regional neighbors and the international community therefore swiftly responded to the DPRK's missile and nuclear tests in 2006.

Following the DPRK's July 5, 2006, missile test, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1695 on July 15, condemning Pyongyang's missile launch and initiating missile-specific sanctions. After Pyongyang's announcement of a nuclear test on October 9, 2006, the Security Council quickly passed Resolution 1718 on October 14, condemning the DPRK's destructive action and launching nuclear-specific and wider sanctions. A few other countries

**China's perspective
on sanctions has
evolved significantly.**

also put forward unilateral sanctions against North Korea. For instance, Japan launched sanctions that denied port calls to North Korean ships and prevented Japanese ships from trading in open seas with DPRK ships.

These punitive actions were imposed as the denuclearization negotiations known as the six-party talks continued. Since the October 2006 nuclear test, Pyongyang has moved to a fundamentally different stance on its nuclear weapons capability. Given the DPRK's new bargaining chip and the U.S. overstretch in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States was forced to moderate its position in the six-party talks. Since January 2007, Pyongyang and Washington have managed to negotiate a nuclear disablement scheme for the DPRK to follow and have overcome many unexpected difficulties not directly related to nuclear disablement, such as the imposition and subsequent lifting of the aforementioned financial sanctions against Pyongyang.

By the end of 2007, the DPRK had disabled most of its three Yongbyon-based nuclear facilities, including a five-megawatt electric experimental reactor, a reprocessing plant, and the nuclear fuel rod fabrication facility. Despite this significant progress, North Korea failed to submit a complete and correct declaration of all its nuclear programs by December 31, 2007.¹⁶ Indeed, there is still a long way to go from nuclear disablement to nuclear dismantlement and then to nuclear disarmament.

MEETING THE CRITERIA

Has the DPRK's progress in nuclear disablement been linked to the international sanctions placed on it? Without the external pressures of sanctions, the DPRK would not likely have voluntarily disabled its nuclear weapons capacity. These sanctions have more grounds for legitimacy than those against Iran. In the Iranian case, Tehran still claims to adhere to the NPT and vows not to develop nuclear weapons, and IAEA inspections have concluded that the nature of the ongoing uranium enrichment is peaceful. With the DPRK's clear case of weaponization, collective sanctions are more warranted, and international legal and moral support is more easily gathered.

On the second criterion, the stakes for sanction-imposing states, the complicated security environment in Northeast Asia means that Pyongyang's pursuit of nuclear weapons can hardly be accepted by any actors in the region. China is deeply concerned that Pyongyang's proliferation could have a domino effect, deteriorating the regional security situation. South Korea and Japan may be pressured to follow suit, and the United States will be even more preoccupied with maintaining the regional balance of power. All of these actors therefore share common stakes in reversing the DPRK's nuclear status, giving cohesive impetus to the six-party talks.

This regional collaboration in Northeast Asia contrasts with the case of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East. The threat of proliferation in each area is obviously very serious. Yet, international consensus on stemming Iran's nuclear development seems weaker than the consensus against the DPRK's program, as Iran has energy leverage and enjoys certain sympathy from some regional actors in Middle Eastern and Muslim constituencies.

Third, as relevant parties have their respective interests converging on disabling the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, the international efforts to

dissolve Pyongyang's nuclear ambition have secured considerable participation, sending an authoritative message to the hermit kingdom's leadership. The six-party talks have brought three nuclear-weapon powers and two major industrialized countries to the table to share resources for the disablement endeavor. China's proactive role in hosting the talks, using its leverage and devising mutually acceptable compromises, has been instrumental in moving the initial discussions forward.

China's views on sanctions are shaped by its own experiences on the receiving end.

Finally, the adequacy of the sanctions' strength, the final criterion, matters. Resolution 1718 bars the DPRK's access to the international community in terms of nuclear and missile development and orders countries to restrict Pyongyang's access to heavy conventional weapons as well as some luxuries its leadership may be interested in continuing to acquire. Compared with the Iranian sanctions, those against North Korea are better organized, better designed, and heavier and wider in substance, although they are similarly limited primarily to specifically tailored areas without touching civilian and economic dimensions.¹⁷ This carefully crafted sanctions strategy serves as effective leverage against Pyongyang. In the meantime, the Bush administration has adjusted its approach and is offering North Korea certain incentives, such as lifting financial sanctions without a North Korean apology and shipping heavy oil to North Korea before Pyongyang has disabled its nuclear facilities, enticing North Korea to reciprocate.

HOW MUCH HAVE THEY MATTERED?

Yet, these sanctions measures are far from perfect. Once the DPRK quit the NPT, it indeed regained its freedom of action from an international legal standpoint, raising questions about the legitimacy of sanctions. Although members of the six-party talks share important common interests in seeing the Korean peninsula free of nuclear weapons, some of them have serious security issues with each

other. For example, the distrust between China and the United States on the question of Taiwan prevents them from carrying out even deeper cooperation. Moreover, U.S. policy toward North Korea seems fragmented and inconsistent from time to time, undercutting the effectiveness both of dialogue with and sanctions on the DPRK, while intensifying the fundamental distrust between North Korea and the United States. As a result, the lack of further progress on the North Korean nuclear program may not be so surprising.

Given this set of four criteria for effective sanctions, sanctions on Iran's nuclear behavior have not yet been effective, whereas sanctions against the DPRK's nuclear development have been more or less successful because of the degree of legitimacy, stakes for participants, international participation, and strength of the sanctions.

China's Changing Stance

China's perspective on the issue of sanctions has evolved significantly over time, culminating in its changing attitude toward sanctions and participation first in the sanctions against South Africa and now both sets of UN sanctions against Iran and North Korea. Historically, Beijing has asserted that exerting pressure on a state constitutes an unacceptable approach to resolving international disputes. China considers sovereignty to be a sacred ideal deserving to be safeguarded. For many years, Beijing thought that sovereignty should be absolute regardless of the nature of a state's internal affairs. In the 1950s, China and India proposed "five principles of peaceful coexistence," placing noninterference above all, based on the understanding that newly decolonized states tended to be particularly vulnerable to external pressures.

Yet, China's contemporary stance toward sanctions is still evolving, reflecting its changing perspectives and interests in an increasingly interdependent world. To some extent, it has modified its traditional sovereignty rhetoric. Although China has been consistently and strongly opposed to any international interference, it condemned apartheid and distanced itself from South Africa during the Cold War. China did so because it believed that Pretoria's white supremacy was fundamentally against human rights and that the antiapartheid movement was part of a national independence and political liberation movement in Africa. In the meantime, Beijing had to compete with Taiwan over its policy toward South Africa. Mainland China had long supported Nelson Mandela and the African National Congress of South Africa. Although Taiwan recognized the apartheid regime, it eventually lost its official relationship with South Africa after Mandela took power.¹⁸

China's views on sanctions are also shaped by its own experiences on the receiving end of these measures. For the last two decades, the European Union

and United States have had an arms embargo in place against China for its handling of the student demonstrations in Tiananmen Square in 1989. From a political standpoint, Beijing believes that sanctions render nations unequal and tend to suppress less developed countries. The sanctions launched in 1989 have made China unable to access EU and U.S. weapons markets for Chinese force modernization. Given its own experiences with foreign intervention in its affairs, China tends to find international sanctions objectionable.

With interdependence, China has to adjust its traditionally held value of absolute sovereignty.

With its economic reform over the last three decades, however, China is now heavily interdependent with the world and has diversified interests. It now looks to protect its sovereignty through one-on-one diplomacy and multilateral tactics on the international stage. The two nuclear cases of Iran and North Korea compel China to honor its own pledges under the NPT. Moreover, it is in China's interest to ensure that Iran and the DPRK do not develop nuclear weapons. Under these circumstances,

dealing with Iran and the DPRK in certain multilateral settings adds to China's nonproliferation diplomacy with each of them. China, a sanctioned state, has joined the UN sanctions concerning North Korean and Iranian nuclear and/or missile development¹⁹—quite a significant development of China's move toward being a responsible stakeholder in the international system.

Traditionally, the development of such weapons of mass destruction and missiles has been the decision of a sovereign nation. China has developed its own nuclear weapons and missile capability according to this argument. Yet, Beijing now considers its commitment to regional stability and international nonproliferation regimes to be high priorities. In a time of globalization, China's economic and security interests have become intertwined with securing a stable peripheral environment and a peaceful world. Consequently, China has to adjust its traditionally held value of an abstract and absolute sovereignty.

Prospects for Progress

The effectiveness of sanctions is far from guaranteed. If they are to be used as a tool in international politics, their designers must make them legitimate, popular, and strong and balance their incentives and disincentives. The ongoing sanctions against Iran have not met such criteria well, and the chances of their success are limited so far. If a scheme could be developed in which these criteria are better met, it is possible to prevent Iran from pushing for non-peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

After many frustrations over finding a solution to the North Korean situation, however, a peaceful remedy may be possible down the road because a balance of incentives and disincentives has been in play. Sanctions against the DPRK's nuclear and missile development have been much better designed, with proper emphasis on legitimacy, stakes, popularity, and strength. Yet, this does not necessarily guarantee success. North Korea's eventual nuclear disarmament still demands a change in the leadership's security perceptions and in the statecraft of other involved parties. China has been adjusting its stance over the years regarding sanctions and now is playing a more proactive role in responsibly imposing sanctions to deal with issues of nonproliferation and regional stability.

Notes

1. Rose Gottemoeller, "The Evolution of Sanctions in Practice and Theory," *Survival* 49, no. 4 (Winter 2007–08): 99–110.
2. See Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy*, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), p. 123.
3. United Nations (UN), "Charter of the United Nations," <http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/> (hereinafter UN Charter).
4. See UN General Assembly, Resolution 3324 (XXIX), December 16, 1974, art. E8, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/29/ares29.htm>.
5. UN Charter, art. 35(2).
6. UN Security Council, S/RES/687, April 8, 1991, <http://www.un.org/Docs/scres/1991/scres91.htm>.
7. David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 9; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," *International Security* 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 93; Gary C. Hufbauer, "Ineffectiveness of Economic Sanctions: Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990s," *American Economic Review*, no. 89 (May 1999): 403; Kimberly A. Elliot, "The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty?" *International Security* 23, no. 1 (Summer 1998): 53.
8. Yang Xingli, Ji Kaiyun, and Chen Junhua, *A Study on Iranian-U.S. Relations* [in Chinese] (Beijing: Shishi Publishing House, 2006), pp. 299–301; Fan Hongda, *The United States and Iran: A Friendly Period* [in Chinese] (Beijing: Social Science Academic Press, 2006).
9. Office of the Director of National Intelligence, "National Intelligence Estimate: Iran: Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities," November 2007, http://www.dni.gov/press_releases/20071203_release.pdf (press release).
10. IAEA Board of Governors, "Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and Relevant Provisions of Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the Islamic Republic of Iran," GOV/2008/4, February 22, 2008, <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2007/gov2007-58.pdf>.
11. *Ibid.*
12. UN Security Council, S/RES/1737, December 23, 2006, para. 2, http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc_resolutions06.htm.

13. For debates over sanctions against Iran, see Vali Nasr and Ray Takeyh, "The Cost of Containing Iran: Washington's Misguided New Middle East Policy," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (January/February 2008), <http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87106/vali-nasr-ray-takeyh/the-costs-of-containing-iran.html>; Joseph Cirincione and Andrew Grotto, "Contain and Engage: A New Strategy for Resolving the Nuclear Crisis With Iran," 2007, p. 46, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2007/02/pdf/iran_report.pdf; Ephraim Kam, "A Nuclear Iran: What Does It Mean, and What Can Be Done," *Institute for National Security Studies Memorandum*, no. 88 (February 2007), p. 84; Robert O. Freedman, "Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Question: The Putin Record," 2006, <http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB737.pdf>; Shahram Chubin, *Iran's Nuclear Ambitions* (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2006), pp. 81–112.
14. Alexei Arbatov, "Withdrawal From the Non-Proliferation Treaty," in *At the Nuclear Threshold: The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime*, ed. Alexei Arbatov (Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2007), pp. 77–89.
15. See "Joint Declaration of the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula," January 20, 1992, <http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/or/2004/31011.htm>.
16. See "Full Text of Joint Document of the Second Session of the Sixth Round Six-Party Talks," Chinaview.cn, October 3, 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/03/content_6829017.htm.
17. Marcus Noland, "The Economic Implications of a North Korean Nuclear Test," *Asia Policy*, no. 2 (July 2006): 25–39; "Pyongyang Fears Regime Collapse Under Sanctions," *Times* (London), February 12, 2006, p. 22.
18. Qian Qichen, *Ten Episodes in China's Diplomacy* [in Chinese] (Beijing: World Affairs Press: 2006).
19. Dingli Shen, "Iran's Nuclear Ambitions Test China's Wisdom," *The Washington Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (Spring 2006): 55–66; John W. Garver, *China & Iran: Ancient Partners in a Post-Imperial World* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006), pp. 281–301.